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Does the interstate cooperation in the CIA black site program imply the anti-
torture norm was severely degraded in the war on terror?  Most scholarship on 
the CIA black sites suggests yes by focusing on the outcome of the program – 
that active cooperation led to torture.  This paper argues alternatively that a 
focus on the process of cooperation provides a better means to assess the 
strength of the anti-torture norm.  Using the Senate report on the CIA’s 
detention and interrogation program, this paper argues that anti-torture norm 
had continuous causal effects on the interstate cooperation that are currently 
unrecognized in the literature. 
Keywords: torture, rendition, CIA, black sites, war on terror 
Introduction 
On 3 December 2014, the United States Senate Select Committee on Intelligence released its 
initial findings and conclusions on the CIA’s Detention and Interrogation Program.  This report 
widely criticized the conduct of the CIA and their agents at various “black sites,” the colloquial 
name for CIA detention and interrogation facilities housed outside of the United States.  The 
report was a thorough rebuke of the CIA’s black site program.  Not only did it point out 
problems in the administration of the program and accused the CIA of misleading other 
departments of the US government, but in arguably the most damning finding, it found that 
the enhanced interrogation program was ‘not an effective means of acquiring intelligence or 
gaining cooperation,’1 striking at the very purpose of the program itself.   
The Senate report is the latest public blow to the CIA’s rendition program, which 
abducted and transported terrorist suspects to CIA black sites or to states that tortured them 
by proxy for the United States.  For human rights activists concerned with the state of 
international human rights norms, it worryingly falls in line with previous investigations of the 
rendition program that discovered of webs of cooperation between the United States and 
other states in the abduction, transport, and torture of terrorist suspects.  The number of 
states agreeing to host these black sites where the CIA was free to torture detainees, believed 
to include Poland, Romania, Lithuania, Thailand, and Afghanistan, should be of particular 
concern.  Several of these states are liberal democracies – states thought most likely to uphold 
                                                          
1
 Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, "Committee Study of the Central Intelligence Agency's 
Detention and Interrogation Program," 3 December 2014, 2. 
fundamental human rights – and as such this conduct questions the integrity of the prohibition 
against torture.  If these states are freely willing to host CIA facilities that torture prisoners, 
then what does this say about the strength of the anti-torture norm? 2 
This article seeks to arrive at an updated conclusion to this question given the 
information contained in the Senate report.  It should be said that the question itself is 
reasonably neglected – most of the writing on the CIA black sites has failed to consider what 
this conduct might tell us about the state of the international anti-torture norm.  The CIA black 
site scholarship, alternatively, has by and large focused on the legal implications of the 
program, the domestic politics surrounding the decision making, or the plight of individual 
prisoners.3  When the subject of inter-state cooperation arises, the existing literature uses the 
cooperation of the partner states primarily to demonstrate their ethical culpability.  As 
Malinda Smith argued, ‘governments across Europe and elsewhere knew about these sites and 
the interrogation techniques that took place inside them and, thus, were complicit in human 
rights abuses.’4  Others such as J. D. Boys used the cooperation to point out the hypocrisy of 
the cooperating states.5  As Richard Aldrich put it succinctly, ‘European politicians, faced with 
the classic dilemmas of conducting counter-terrorism in a liberal society, have dealt with this 
by playing to public opinion with their criticisms of American covert activity; meanwhile they 
have approved discreet cooperation with the very same programmes.’6  Still other scholars 
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noted that the United States provided financial incentives to some of these states in return for 
the use of the sites, only heightening the accusation that their actions were ethically suspect.7   
This framing paints a very bleak picture of the strength of the anti-torture norm, 
implying that these states were active partners in the detention and torture of numerous 
individuals.  If this is the case, it demonstrates a massive failure of human rights socialization 
over a fundamental right, torture, across states that should be the most likely to uphold these 
rights. Moreover, these webs of cooperation might also signal that many states believed that 
the anti-torture norm had been sufficiently weakened by the war on terror that they were 
unlikely to face serious repercussions for their defection.  This worry, that the war on terror 
has damaged the international anti-torture norm, is certainly not new.  For instance, in a 2005 
report by then United Nations Special Rapporteur on Torture Manfred Nowak, he argued that 
‘For the first time since World War II, this important consensus [on torture] of the 
international community seems to have been called into question by some Governments in 
the context of their counter-terrorism strategies.’8  The fact that many states actively 
cooperated with the CIA in the black site program only heightens this concern that states have 
too easily ignored fundamental human rights norms in their persecution of the war on terror.   
This paper argues, conversely, that the silver lining to an otherwise depressing report 
on CIA conduct from the Senate shows that this framing of the black site program, which feeds 
into our perceptions of the strength of the international anti-torture norm, is too negative.9  
This is not to say that collusion with the United States did not occur, or that states were simply 
unaware of what the United States was doing.  Instead, this paper argues that that although 
cooperation occurred, the anti-torture norm had a significant causal effect that is otherwise 
unrecognized in the current literature.10  The fundamental problem in the current literature on 
the CIA black sites that prevents a similar interpretation is a determined focus on outcome – 
that certain states cooperated and torture occurred.  This focus on outcome, consequently, 
drives a very negative assessment of the state of the anti-torture norm.  However, if we wish 
to truly understand what the CIA black site program tells us about the state of the norm, we 
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Kurki, Causation in International Relations: Reclaiming Causal Analysis  (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2008), 168-73,78-87. 
are better to consider process rather than outcome.11  That is, the key question needs to be 
transformed from whether these states cooperated in the black site program to in what way 
did these states cooperate over time?   In asking this alternative question, the Senate report 
provides us with crucial information that paints a picture not of states actively cooperating in 
the CIA rendition program, but states that cooperated only through continuous diplomatic 
pressure and financial assistance to sustain what were often volatile arrangements.   
To make this argument this paper proceeds in two steps.  First, it provides an overview 
of the current understanding of the CIA black sites and the controversies surrounding them, 
moving to a theoretical argument concerning the importance of considering process in 
addition to outcome if we want to understand the strength of the anti-torture norm.  Second, 
it suggests that despite the ability of the CIA to procure these sites through the cooperation of 
many foreign governments, there is significant evidence that the CIA was greatly hindered by 
human rights concerns.  As such, the state of the anti-torture norm, even with respect to a 
secret program enacted soon after 9/11, was far stronger than the current literature suggests. 
The Anti-Torture Norm and CIA Black Sites 
The general public has been aware of the existence of CIA black sites since the December 2002 
publication of a Washington Post article on black sites in Afghanistan.12  It was not until 
November 2005, however, that that the media first reported that the CIA was hiding and 
interrogating al Qaeda captives in Eastern Europe, where they were permitted to use 
‘enhanced interrogation techniques.’13  A week after these revelations, The New York Times 
published a classified 2004 CIA report, initially written in early 2002, that featured a list of 10 
interrogation techniques for high-value detainees, including methods generally considered to 
constitute torture such as waterboarding.14  As such, both the bulk of the program and the 
seriousness of the torture allegations was a secret from the public for a period of over four 
years after 9/11.   
Even if they did not know directly, there is little possibility that the leadership of the 
states involved could not have foreseen that some type of abuse could take place in these 
facilities.  There was no shortage of evidence throughout this four-year period that something 
more than simple interrogations or detention might be taking place.  From the very beginning, 
the tone of the Bush administration signaled that the United States was willing to go beyond 
the normal bounds of conduct.  Days after September 11, Vice President Cheney went on a 
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major television news program to declare that, ‘We also have to work, though, sort of the dark 
side, if you will.  We’ve got to spend time in the shadows in the intelligence world.’15  Even 
major spokespersons for the Democratic opposition, such as Senator John Kerry, argued that 
special means were necessary, arguing that ‘when you’re at war, there are some tough 
methods that on occasion have been employed and are permissible that are short of torture.’16  
Major media outlets in 2001 suggested that both the FBI and CIA were looking into ‘trust 
serums’ and rough interrogation techniques.17  The media scrutiny over the treatment of 
prisoners at Guantanamo Bay in a 2002 Daily Mail article gave these issues a visual form with 
the famous photos of the detainees in orange jumpsuits.18  Throughout 2002 several stories 
were printed that suggested that harsher techniques, including sleep deprivation, temperature 
variation, stress positions, and humiliation was being used by the United States on detainees 
to extract information.19  In an oft-quoted display of this changed attitude, Cofer Black, in 
charge of counter-terrorism at the CIA, argued before the House and Senate Intelligence 
Committees that ‘After 9/11, the gloves came off.’20  So even before the revelations of Abu 
Ghraib that solidified the image of torture at the hands of US officials, there were many public 
indications that the Bush administration was willing to explore the boundaries of what might 
be deemed acceptable conduct in order to gain intelligence in the war on terror.  Given the 
severity of torture within the international human rights system, properly socialized 
government officials would understand that they had a duty to ensure that no such activities 
were taking place in light of this ongoing discourse.21  Claiming that they simply had no 
oversight and turning a blind eye demonstrates a failure of socialization into the anti-torture 
norm.   
There is also evidence that the black site program at times required extensive 
cooperation with the host states, so there is little doubt that at least some key elements within 
their administrations knowingly participated.  This reached far beyond simply giving 
permission to host the black sites.  According to a Council of Europe report, the CIA would file 
fake flight plans that would make it look like the flights were going elsewhere.  For example, 
once flights entered Polish airspace, the aviation authority would secretly help the plane to 
land at an airport near the detention site without creating any public documentation.  They 
would also file a one-way flight out of the country in order to obfuscate the real nature of the 
flight.22  Given the necessity of these fairly complicated cooperative arrangements, as David 
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 "Meet the Press," NBC, 16 September 2001. 
16
 "Live Event," Fox News Network,, 25 October 2001. 
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Forsythe put it, ‘It is unlikely that secret CIA interrogation centers could have existed in Europe 
… without some knowledge and cooperation by at least some European security managers.’23 
We are thus left with a situation where there is a great deal of information suggesting 
that the United States was prepared to engage in potentially torturous methods and little 
doubt that active cooperation occurred between the United States and the states hosting the 
CIA black sites.  On the face of it, and in line with much of what is written in the literature, this 
is an exceptionally damning indictment of the cooperating states and throws up large 
questions about the strength of the anti-torture norm within the international human rights 
system.   
This assessment is largely driven by a focus on outcome found in much of the 
literature, that states knowingly cooperated and facilitated torture.  This focus is certainly 
understandable because of the nature of the human rights violation.  The prohibition against 
torture, from the Universal Declaration of Human Rights onwards, is absolute, that ‘No one 
shall be subjected to torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.’24  It is 
jus cogens or pre-emptory, meaning that there can be no justification for the use of torture in 
any situation. As the Convention against Torture puts it, ‘no exceptional circumstances 
whatsoever … may be invoked as a justification of torture.’25  Furthermore, this prohibition is 
so strong that any treaty that might accommodate torture, or even the international transfer 
of prisoners for the purposes of torture, would be automatically considered null and void 
under the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.26  There is simply no middle ground in 
the understanding jus cogens rights by definition.  Since there is no possibility of derogation, 
from a legal perspective the process through which a government arrived at the decision to 
torture does not matter, since there is no possibility of excusing the action due to exceptional 
circumstances. 
This legal framework that focuses solely on the binary outcome of whether a 
government chose to torture or not torture is replicated in much of the political writing on the 
subject.  Major quantitative studies on whether norms have effects on torture treat the 
presence or absence of torture as the dependent variable, sometimes with additional nuances 
on the exact level of torture should it exist.27  More qualitative and normative arguments 
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 David P Forsythe, "United States Policy toward Enemy Detainees in the “War on Terrorism”," Human 
Rights Quarterly 28, no. 2 (2006): 483. 
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 United Nations, "The Universal Declaration of Human Rights," (1948): Article 5. Emphasis mine 
25
 "Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment," 
(1984).  The reason for torture being jus cogens has been explored recently by scholars who argue 
that this level of prohibition arises from the liberal abhorrence to intentional suffering, see Kamila 
Stullerova, "Rethinking Human Rights," International Politics 50, no. 5 (2013); David Luban, 
"Liberalism, Torture, and the Ticking Bomb," Virginia Law Review 91, no. 6 (2005). 
26
 Erika de Wet, "The Prohibition of Torture as an International Norm of Jus Cogens and Its Implications 
for National and Customary Law," European Journal of International Law 15, no. 1: 98-99; Andrea 
Bianchi, "Human Rights and the Magic of Jus Cogens," The European Journal of International Law 19, 
no. 3 (2008): 496. 
27
 Michael J Gilligan and Nathaniel H Nesbitt, "Do Norms Reduce Torture?," Journal of Legal Studies 38, 
no. 2 (2009); Oona A Hathaway, "Why Do Countries Commit to Human Rights Treaties?," The Journal 
about torture in the war on terror also tend to stress the necessity and absoluteness of the 
prohibition itself, reflecting the high degree of moral revulsion at the practice.  As Eugene 
Robinson stated in an editorial in the Washington Post, ‘The “debate” over torture is almost as 
grotesque as torture itself.  There can be no legitimate debate about the intentional inflection 
of pain upon captive and defenceless human beings.’28 Rosemary Foot also focusses on the jus 
cogens argument in her E. H. Carr Memorial Lecture, claiming that, ‘the torture convention 
allows for no derogation because torture has been recognized as a most profound violation of 
human dignity.’29  As a consequence, when considering the effects on US derogation from the 
anti-torture norm, she speaks about ‘how unrestrained many governments believe themselves 
to be when the most powerful state in the international system elevates counter-terrorist 
action above other values.  Torture and other forms of abuse become commonplace and often 
more openly so.’30  The implicit model in this statement seems to be that once the United 
States decides to abandon its support for the prohibition against torture, other states simply 
either follow suit or revert back to previous habits.  The focus is on the change in the 
propensity to commit (or not commit) torture itself – and not on the process through which 
these states might negotiate such a change.  Finally, the existing literature on the black sites, 
as previously mentioned, tends to focus on the torture done to detainees and its lasting effects 
or interrogates the legal reasoning used by the Bush administration.  This certainly helps to 
publicize the instances where torture occurred to reinforce the moral revulsion we should 
have at the practice, but it also treats the outcome as the most important element of 
investigation. 
To reiterate, given the strict moral and legal prohibitions against the use of torture it is 
not surprising that the primary focus of scholarship and advocacy concerns uncovering and 
criticizing those events where torture occurred.  However, the problem with focusing on 
torture as an all-or-nothing phenomenon – that either a state chooses to torture or aid in 
torture, or it does not – prevents us from painting a more complicated picture about norms 
concerning torture and the nature of human rights more generally.  Specifically, and it hides 
the dynamics at play that might help us to understand the severity of the problem itself.  
States might decide to torture, and there is no question that this is ethically indefensible.  
However, in line with much of the constructivist literature that stresses the importance of 
analysing social processes,31 the way in which these states proceed is equally as important to 
study if we want to understand the strength of the prohibition against torture itself. 
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 Though this scholarship is bountiful, some of the more important works are Thomas Risse, Stephen C 
Ropp, and Kathryn Sikkink, eds., The Persistent Power of Human Rights: From Commitment to 
Compliance (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013); Thomas Risse and Kathryn Sikkink, "The 
Socialization of International Human Rights Norms into Domestic Practices: Introduction," in The 
Focusing on process expands the range of possibilities in state interaction regarding 
the prohibition against torture.  For instance, at one extreme, the prohibition against torture 
could be socialized to the extent that it becomes a taken-for-granted norm.  As such, its 
reproduction on the part of the state leadership becomes automatic, taken-for-granted, and 
habitual.32  The norm acts as a filter that removes certain possibilities from the table 
altogether.33  States whose leadership have internalized the anti-torture norm will simply 
never cooperate with the United States.  This type of socialization reflects the jus cogens 
nature of the anti-torture norm itself, which stresses that there is no acceptable reason to 
engage in torture.  Were these the only actors in international politics, human rights activists 
could sleep easily knowing that the anti-torture norm was as secure as its legal and moral 
prohibition reflects. 
We know, however, that there are many individuals within positions of political power 
that are not completely habituated into the anti-torture norm.  This does not mean that they 
‘support’ torture per se, only that they will consider the anti-torture norm to be part of a 
consequentialist analysis that includes both the value they place in the anti-torture norm itself 
and the possibility of external sanction should their derogation be discovered.34  Where this is 
the case, there are variables in play that are irrelevant where the anti-torture norm is 
habitually socialized.   
First, there is room for these individuals to be convinced by others that the 
circumstances are currently such that torture might be permitted, both in terms of the arguing 
against the moral prohibition of torture and arguing that the current strength of the 
international anti-torture norm is less than they perceive.  Second, there is the potential for 
more coercive forms of interaction whereby the benefits to cooperation, or the costs to non-
cooperation, are increased above their reservations over whether torture should be used.35  
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However, since these individuals are also aware that they reside in domestic and international 
political environments where the use of torture might not be appreciated, they not only need 
to struggle with their own internal beliefs and the pressures placed on them by the United 
States, but with the political consequences of facing electoral or diplomatic punishment36 or 
social stigmatization37 should they decide to help facilitate the torture.   
These individuals will be open to the possibility of violating the norm, but also will act 
in such a way that they signal their awareness of the norm itself by either requiring incentives 
for cooperation or other types of diplomatic assurances.  The more that they have either 
internalized the norm and/or38 believe it to be strong, the more they will require these 
incentives and the more difficult it will be for the United States to establish stable cooperation.  
Likewise, individuals that do not subscribe to the norm at all and believe it to be weak will be 
the most more likely to enter into stable cooperative relationships without many inducements.  
In sum, a state led by individuals who have not internalized the anti-torture norm might violate 
it, but the violation itself does not unto itself mean that the norm has failed to have a causal 
effect on the outcome.  To understand whether this is the case or not with respect to the CIA 
black sites, we need to examine the process through which cooperation occurred.     
A final component necessary to understand the strength of the anti-torture norm 
concerns not only an analysis of the nature of the cooperation between states, but also in how 
this cooperation changes over time.  If the individuals’ support for the norm is weakened 
through the cooperation and/or they believe the strength of the international norm itself to be 
weakened, then we should expect fewer problems in the cooperative relationship over time 
and less need for inducements – and vice versa.39  As such, there are two questions that can be 
asked that can help us to understand the strength of the anti-torture norm in light of the CIA 
black site programme:  does the cooperation seem reasonably stable with the need for few 
necessary inducements on the part of the United States or does it not, and does the stability of 
the relationships seem to increase or decrease over time?   
This indication of the strength or weakness of the anti-torture norm is only augmented 
in the case of the black site program since it was run in near secrecy for almost four years.  Ian 
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Hurd has already noted that secrecy allows states to temporarily avoid the costs of acting in an 
illegitimate manner,40 which can be very useful for those breaking human rights norms.  But 
the character of the secret cooperation can also give us an indication of the state of the anti-
torture norm more than can the character of open cooperation, exactly because there are no 
immediate costs to breaking the norm when secrecy is available.  As such, secrecy presents the 
best possible structural condition to break norms, only augmenting any observations of state 
hesitancy to cooperate with the United States. 
In summary, the process of norm violation over time, particularly during periods of 
secrecy when states are not facing the possibility of immediate sanction, becomes as 
important as the violation of the norm itself if we want to understand the strength of the anti-
torture norm.  If these states initially cooperated freely, or did so increasingly, then we might 
be able to claim the possibility of a reverse cascade or reverse norm spiral.41   This result would 
then reinforce the perspective that we obtain if we only consider the outcome of the 
defections – that it represents a massive failure of human rights socialization.  However, if 
states cooperate with a great amount of reservation such that the United States had to expend 
a great effort to sustain this cooperation, particularly when the program is secret, we can 
make a claim that the effect of the human rights system is much stronger than we would think 
had we only considered the defections themselves.   
The Senate report on the CIA black site program, despite its negative tone with respect 
to the program itself, provides a good amount of information necessary to make a claim 
concerning this issue.42  It shows not only that the CIA had constant problems maintaining 
interstate cooperation while the program remained secret, but also that these problems 
became significantly worse after the program was revealed to the public – effectively ending 
sustained cooperation with almost all of their partners.  As such, despite the fact that many 
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states cooperated with the CIA to host the black sites, there is little evidence that they did so 
easily, pointing to either their own struggles with the anti-torture norm and/or their belief that 
it is a strong norm that will lead them to incur costs should the program be revealed.  
Cooperation with the CIA Black Site Program 
The first major issue suggesting that cooperation was not automatic concerns the number of 
times the CIA had to offer financial incentives to foreign governments into accepting the 
sites.43  The report’s conclusion suggests that ‘to encourage governments to clandestinely host 
CIA detention sites, or to increase support for existing sites, the CIA provided millions of dollars 
in cash payments to foreign government officials.’44  This fact is also reflected in the discussion 
of individual sites.  For instance, at Detention Site Green45 the host government made requests 
for financial support in exchange for the continued functioning of the facility. 46  When the CIA 
decided to create Detention Site Black in 2003, CIA Headquarters asked the CIA Station in one 
of the countries to ‘identify ways to support the [REDACTED] in Country [REDACTED] to 
“demonstrate to [REDACTED] and the highest levels of the [Country [REDACTED]] government 
that we deeply appreciate their cooperation and support” for the detention program.’47  The 
CIA Station subsequently put together a multi-million dollar ‘wish list,’ to which CIA 
Headquarters eventually authorized several million more than what was requested for the 
“purposes of the [REDACTED] subsidy”.48   
Similarly, in the creation of what is likely Detention Site Violet the CIA ‘also offered 
$[REDACTED] million to the [REDACTED] to “show appreciation” for the [REDACTED] support 
for the program,’ which ultimately led to the approval of the expansion of the CIA facility.49  In 
the interim, the CIA continued to funnel money into the country, with the report stating that 
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‘the CIA and [REDACTED] developed complex mechanisms to [REDACTED] in order to provide 
the $[REDACTED] million to the [REDACTED].’50    
So there is a good deal of evidence that the CIA paid out tens if not hundreds of 
millions of dollars in support to governments or elements of governments in exchange for the 
hosting of the black sites.  Moreover, CIA headquarters recognized the link between this 
financial support and cooperation.  In 2003, they asked one CIA station to ‘advise if additional 
funds may be needed to keep [the facility] viable over the coming year and beyond,’ because 
‘we cannot have enough blacksite hosts, and we are loathe to let one we have slip away.’51  
Providing financial incentives to black site hosting governments not only occurred, but was 
seen as an important element in ensuring cooperation, even while the black site program was 
secret.   
Giving money to foreign governments itself is not enough to make a claim that human 
rights norms were in effect.  One could make an argument that the smaller states might see 
this simply as an opportunity to gain side-payments for cooperative behaviour.  No doubt this 
has some credibility.  In order to suggest that the costs paid by the CIA for the maintenance of 
their program might have arisen from norms against torture, we need to explore the political 
dialogue that took place at the same time – coming both from the partner states and in the 
CIA’s own awareness of the problems that the anti-torture norm might create.   
One of the first pieces of evidence comes from how one state, likely Poland, wanted 
the CIA to sign a Memorandum of Understanding covering the roles and responsibilities of the 
CIA, which the CIA did not sign but instead offered money in compensation.  Even after the 
facility was operational and money had changed hands, this state still initially rejected the 
transfer of particular prisoners to this site, including Khalid Shaykh Muhammad.  This decision 
was only reversed after active diplomatic intervention and an additional financial incentive of 
millions of dollars.52  Likewise in the state hosting Detention Site Green, the CIA faced 
widespread domestic political opposition to the program even prior to any public revelations 
of the program and given ongoing fiscal support.  The report argues that the site would have 
been closed much earlier if it had not been for continued lobbying by the chief of the Station.53  
Finally, the mixed messages sent from the United States over whether the International 
Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) should be granted access to the detainees created tensions 
in the bilateral relationships between the United States and hosting states, particularly given 
the pressure the ICRC was putting on these governments for access.54  In sum, there are 
several indications in the Senate report that the these states had concerns with the program 
that were manifested in requesting formal agreements concerning roles and responsibilities, 
caution over the transfer of certain prisoners, and outright internal political opposition, at 
times linked to pressure from humanitarian international organizations – even though the 
program at this point was not known to the public.   
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In addition to the responses of the partner states themselves, there is a good deal of 
evidence that members of the United States government themselves were aware of, and 
concerned about, breaking the anti-torture norm.  Several diplomatic concerns were raised 
over the detention sites themselves.  For instance, in August 2003 a US ambassador, likely to 
either Romania or Lithuania, wanted to contact the State Department about the CIA detention 
facility because of the ‘potential impact on our policy vis-à-vis the [country’s] government.’55  
The US ambassador furthermore requested a high-level document that included a statement 
that the interrogation techniques met with legal and human rights standards.56  These 
concerns over anti-torture norms also spanned to questions of legal liability.  Counterterrorism 
Center Legal specifically warned about potential legal action against CIA employees in states 
that might ‘take a different view of the detention and interrogation practices employed by [the 
CIA],’ arguing that there are particular sets of countries that the CIA should avoid because of 
this possibility.57   
The United States was additionally concerned over the effect of potential leaks on the 
hosting states.  A report from J Cofer Black, the Director of Counterterrorism, to the Director of 
Central Intelligence argued in October 2001 that the probability of exposure was only to 
increase over time, and that this could ‘inflame public opinion against the host government’,58 
threatening the cooperation necessary to ensure the continuation of the facility itself.  In a 
subsequent 2002 discussion the rendering of Abu Zubaydah to what was eventually Detention 
Site Green it was noted that ‘[i]f AZ’s prescience does become known, [it is] not clear what the 
impact would be.’59   Furthermore, when a media organization learned that Abu Zubaydah was 
in the state, the CIA station chief argued that any revelation would be damaging to the 
bilateral relations, would likely decrease the possibility that Abu Zubaydah would be allowed 
to remain in the country, and would decrease the possibility that the country would accept the 
detention of future detainees.60  As it was, even though the media did not choose to reveal the 
location of Abu Zubaydah, the fact that the information could be revealed led to the decision 
to close the site.61  In sum, individuals within the CIA understood that there could be 
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considerable problems generated by any potential revelation of the black site program, were 
worried about the legal consequences on CIA agents participating, and faced opposition and 
questioning from other members of the US government, all suggesting in line with the partner 
state behavior that there was an awareness or partial internalization of the anti-torture norm 
that made cooperation difficult – even in the initial years of cooperation when the program 
between all partner states but Afghanistan was secret. 
Despite the continued secrecy, these problems seemed to be only exacerbated by the 
torture scandals in April 2004.  As such, by early 2005, the CIA was looking for a strategy out of 
the black site program, citing ‘unstable relations with host governments and its difficulty in 
identifying additional countries to host CIA detention facilities.’  With respect to one particular 
country, the CIA director argued that ‘Our liaison partners who host these sites are deeply 
concerned by [REDACTED] press leaks, and they are increasingly skeptical of the [U.S. 
government’s] commitment to keep secret their cooperation…. A combination of press leaks, 
international scrutiny of alleged [U.S. government] detainee abuse …. Is eroding our partners’ 
trust in U.S. resolve to protect their identities and supporting roles.’  He continued to argue 
that if a long-term plan was not developed, then the United States should expect most of the 
host countries to formally request the closure of the facilities they host, as hosting these sites 
had a ‘huge risk’ attached to them.  At the very least, public exposure would likely prevent 
even existing facilities to take on additional detainees.62  Similarly, in a March 2005 CIA talking 
points memo for the CIA director, they noted that ‘continuation of status quo will exacerbate 
tensions in these very valuable relationships and cause them to withdraw their critical support 
and cooperation with the [U.S. government].’63   
As the Washington Post summed up, ‘media exposure, bureaucratic fights and 
disputes with foreign governments had all taken a substantial toll’64 by early 2005.   This was 
not a program that was unproblematically accepted by the host states that had no qualms 
about violating the anti-torture norm.  Indeed, the record provided by the Senate Intelligence 
Committee shows us the exact opposite – that in order to successfully operate this program 
the CIA had to constantly negotiate a political minefield with their partner states and spend a 
great deal of money to secure this cooperation.  All states involved, including the United 
States, seemed to operate in a way suggesting that they were either personally torn by 
violating the torture norm and/or were at least aware of the possibilities of running afoul of 
the diplomatic consequences, and this clearly made cooperation significantly more difficult for 
the United States that it would have been if the War on Terror had fundamentally undermined 
the anti-torture norm.  Additionally, there is evidence that the United States itself was not only 
concerned about the potential ramifications should the program become public, but also the 
potentially negative consequences this could have on the states themselves and the bilateral 
relations with them.  Even with presence of secrecy that would otherwise potentially help 
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states to avoid the costs of acting in an illegitimate manner with respect to the anti-torture 
norm, there were significant problems present.      
The revealing of the black site program in November 2005 thus became the final nail in 
the coffin.  The publication of the Washington Post article immediately resulted in a demarche 
to the United States from at least two states, one of whom argued their contribution could be 
in jeopardy.65  The CIA instanly understood that there was a fundamental problem with their 
conduct with respect to international human right norms.  A CIA cable argued that ‘if another 
shoe were to drop,’ then there would be ‘considerable ramifications for U.S. relations with 
[REDACTED] on a number of issues that depended on U.S. credibility in the area of human 
rights.’66  In addition to potential problems arising in their general diplomatic relationships, the 
CIA also expected that the foreign services that helped them to conduct missions would no 
longer be ‘as aggressive or cooperative.’67  For instance, one state that presented a formal 
demarche to the U.S. government was concerned about the effect that the press reports 
would have on radical elements within the state that might lead to increased hostility toward 
the hosting government.  The strain that the scandal placed on the bilateral relationship was 
mentioned in diplomatic meetings between the two states as late as 2009, where the 
government mentioned that if future cooperation with the CIA were to happen, assurances 
would be needed.68  Officials in another state explicitly expressed their ‘deep shock and 
regret,’ and were upset not only in the CIA’s inability to keep the program secret, but also in 
the lack of forewarning for President Bush’s September 2006 public disclosure of the program.  
The CIA station in this state also believed that there was a serious blow to the bilateral 
relationship.69   
These concerns turned out to be well-founded.  The state hosting Detention Site Black 
demanded and obtained the immediate closure of the site.70  The revelation also created wider 
problems in intelligence cooperation.  In April 2006, one government prohibited providing 
information that could lead to the rendition or detention of al-Qaida or other terrorists to U.S. 
Government custody for interrogation, citing that they believe the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights prohibited them from aiding or assisting these CIA operations.71    Even 
states that continued to host black sites tightened up on their cooperative behaviour, creating 
large problems for the CIA.  For instance, the CIA could not get the necessary cooperation for 
one detainee, Ahmad al-Hawsawi, to go to a local hospital.  This forced the CIA to seek 
assistance from three third-party countries to provide medical care to al-Hawasawi and four 
other detainees with acute medical problems, costing the CIA tens of millions of dollars.  These 
ongoing medical issues eventually resulted in the closing of Detention Site Violet some time in 
2006, with the remaining detainees transferred to Detention Site Brown.72  This problem in 
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agreeing on the provision of emergency medical care also arose in another state where the CIA 
attempted to construct a facility.   In this case, the inability to establish protocols for 
emergency medical care close to the site was a significant enough problem for CIA 
Headquarters to argue that the facility should not be activated unless this problem was 
solved.73  In the end, the CIA had invested at least one hundred million dollars to construct the 
new facility, which was never used.  Instead, press reports about the interrogation program 
forced the CIA to give possession of the new facility to the government of the state.74   
In an attempt to save the program given these diplomatic problems, the CIA continued 
to rely on large financial incentives to persuade other states to construct new sites to deal with 
the “[d]windling pool [REDACTED] partners willing to host CIA Blacksites.’75  In at least once 
case, the report argues that despite the fact that financial incentives had been paid to help 
facilitate the cooperation, the states involved were concerned not with whether the CIA 
holding terrorists in the facilities, but with whether or not torture would be used.  The CIA 
eventually did not detain any individuals in the state.76 
In summary, after the program was made public by the Washington Post, the 
problems facing the CIA in maintaining the program increased dramatically to the point that it 
was exceptionally difficult for the CIA, even with large resources and a clear internal belief as 
to the value of these sites, to maintain stable cooperative relationships.  Many governments 
immediately ceased cooperation, and those that continued were far from openly supportive.  
Finally, when the CIA attempted to approach new states to host sites offering similar financial 
incentives, at least some directly confronted them over the potential for human rights abuses.  
All in all, there is little evidence that the anti-torture norm became weaker over time.  In fact, 
the evidence seems to find for the opposite conclusion – that the states reacted as if it were a 
strong norm, minimizing their exposure to potential allegations of defection from the norm as 
soon as they could and actively querying the potential for future defection. 
Conclusion 
There is little question that the United States and its black site partners defected from the jus 
cogens anti-torture norm in their prosecution of the war on terror.  Most of the literature on 
the black sites explores important issues surrounding this defection, including the legal 
disputes, the domestic politics behind these decisions, and the effect that these decisions had 
on the detainees who were tortured.  Given this defection and the severity of the offenses, on 
the face of things it might seem that the war on terror had indeed done considerable harm to 
the right not to be tortured.   
This focus on the outcome of the cooperation that led to the torture of the detainees 
is understandable given that there is no possibility to legally derogate from the torture norm.  
Since there can be no excuse for torture, the means through which it occurred is irrelevant in a 
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legal sense.  However, as this paper has argued, if we stop the analysis at this point – the 
recognition that cooperation occurred that facilitated torture – we fail to recognize the 
underlying strength of the anti-torture norm that can be seen through its causal effects in the 
process of cooperation between the United States and the states hosting the black sites.  If we 
wish to know whether the conduct undermined the anti-torture norm, it is necessary to not 
simply consider the defections themselves, but to look into the process through which the 
violations occurred.   
The recent Senate report on the CIA’s Detention and Interrogation Program, though 
quite damning to the CIA itself, gives us a good deal of new evidence that international human 
rights norms were in play and affecting outcomes from the outset of the program until its 
completion.  In other words, despite the fact that the CIA was able to cooperate with these 
states to set up black sites that facilitated torturous interrogation methods, there is little 
evidence to suggest that the host countries unproblematically cooperated.  Instead, the report 
suggests that the CIA constantly found itself facing difficulties in acquiring and maintaining 
these facilities.  Importantly, even while the sites were secret, there is evidence from the 
conduct of the cooperating states and internal discourses in the CIA itself that all actors were 
worried about the potential effects of violating the anti-torture norm.  Because of this fear, the 
CIA faced numerous diplomatic and fiscal costs to keep their facilities running.  After the 
exposure of the black site program, cooperation became almost impossible, with existing 
partners breaking cooperative ties, and new potential partners querying about torture directly.     
In sum, considering the process through which the derogations occurred gives us a 
more optimistic sense of the strength of the international anti-torture norm even when states 
are acting covertly.  However, this optimism must be nuanced.  So long as the anti-torture 
norm is not habituated in the leadership of all states, there exists the possibility of defection.  
Furthermore, a state like the United States, with bountiful resources, might still feel it 
worthwhile to pay significant costs if it feels utilizing torture to be worthwhile.  However, the 
recognition of these high costs that in this case yielded hesitant and unstable cooperation, 
despite the diplomatic pressure and financial incentives, offers us a glimpse of the serious 
impediments that exist because of the causal effects of the norm against torture.     
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